Allegory can both be related to and differentiated from extended, linguistic metaphor. From one point of view it is simply a super-extended metaphor; from another however it involves a shift from a consciously apprehended metaphorical blend to a consciously apprehended fictional situation. Understanding the nature of this shift involves the issue of blending. Although almost vacuous in its most general versions, if construed as a theory of specifically figurative forms of thought, blending theory does have content. There is as yet however no evidence from experimental psychology for the occurrence of blending. The only presently available evidence for this is the conscious sense of fusion associated with new, poetic metaphor and related phenomena. In Blake's 'A Poison Tree' an allegorical fiction emerges out of a blend whose setting up is prompted by an extended metaphor, which itself in turn emerges out of a conventional metaphor that, almost certainly, does not involve blending. The analysis of 'A Poison Tree' casts vivid light on the relations between blending, allegory and issues of ontology, truth and reference.
Extended metaphor, allegory and reference
Allegory can be regarded as a super-extended metaphor, extended to the point where its language relates only to the metaphorical source. The question arises as to the relation of such super-extended metaphors to 'ordinary' extended metaphor, defined as a linguistic metaphor extending over more than one clause whose language relates directly to both the metaphorical source and target. The term 'allegory' has sometimes been used to include extended metaphor (Crisp, 2005b: 325-6 ). This usage valuably emphasizes the continuity between extended and super-extended metaphor, both involving, as they do, elaborated rather than compressed expressions of metaphorical concepts. In this article however the term 'allegory' will be used, as it often is in literary theory and criticism, to exclude extended metaphor. From one point of view indeed the only difference between allegory and extended metaphor is the degree of their elaboration. From another however there is a qualitative rather than just a quantitative difference.
While extended metaphor involves both source-related and target-related language, allegory involves only source-related language. In the terminology of Black (1981) , while extended metaphor, like any linguistic metaphor, has a metaphorical focus and frame, allegory lacks this distinction. It lacks a 'clash'
Language and Literature 2008 17(4) of possible worlds cannot be discussed here; for a brief discussion of this status and the role of conceptual metaphor theory in understanding it, see Crisp, 2005a: 122-3 .) It is of course often appropriate to concentrate exclusively on one or the other of these sets of properties. Yet no complete cognitive account can totally ignore the logical properties of utterances. Cognitive semantics has to be able to account for these properties as well as many others. Paying attention to the logical properties of extended metaphors and allegories reveals much about the difference between them, and about its cognitive significance.
Possible, and so fictional, situations are not and cannot be blended spaces. Fauconnier (1994) repeatedly emphasizes that mental spaces, of which blended spaces are a species, are not possible worlds; they do not have the logical or metaphysical status of possible worlds. Since possible situations are possible world fragments, they cannot be blended spaces either. The reason is that reference proceeds from and not to mental spaces. A mental space refers; it is never referred to, unless metalinguistically (Fauconnier, 1994: 2, 152; Crisp, 2005a:119) . It is a means, not an object, of reference. A mental space can only be referred to using an explicit semantic metalanguage with the appropriate resources. An object of reference is an object in a possible situation, which is thus something utterly different from a mental space. A mental space will have been set up to effect reference to that object, but that mental space, blended or otherwise, will be a means and not an object of that reference. An allegory, or indeed any fictional or non-fictional text, unless its language possesses metalinguistic resources enabling explicit reference to mental spaces, will never refer to or characterize a mental space, blended or otherwise. It will instead refer to and characterize entities in a possible, fictional, situation. An extended metaphor in contrast vividly evokes the blended space it uses to characterize its literal target, but it still does not refer to or characterize this means of characterization. It is precisely its blended space's lack of any defined logical or metaphysical status, which makes it so different from a possible situation, that accounts for the quality of strangeness in the reader's conscious experience of it (Crisp, 2005a: 124-6) . Extended metaphors create a conscious, and rather strange, experience of metaphorical blended spaces, while allegories refer to and characterize fictional situations functioning as their metaphorical sources. This is the crucial qualitative difference between allegory and extended metaphor.
Yet a sceptic may object that cognitive linguistics must make us question any such claimed qualitative distinction between extended metaphor and allegory: language generally involves continua rather than discrete categories and there is no reason to suppose that extended metaphor and allegory are any different. A text, for example, may introduce an extended metaphor and only subsequently develop it into a full allegory. (Blake's 'A Poison Tree' is an outstanding example of this.) At what exact point in such a text does extended metaphor become allegory? Is there really any such point, as opposed to an intermediate stretch of text that is neither exactly extended metaphor nor allegory? Such stretches of text, the sceptic will argue, must call into question the existence of any qualitative distinction between extended metaphor and allegory. The qualitative difference between extended metaphor and allegory, it is claimed, rests on that between a blended space and a possible situation. We have allegory if, and only if, there is direct reference to entities in a possible situation from which an underlying mapping then proceeds, the target never being referred to directly. We have extended metaphor if, and only if, a metaphorical blended space is used to characterize a target that is directly referred to. The question whether, in texts such as 'A Poison Tree', there is an intermediate stretch of text that is neither extended metaphor nor allegory thus reduces to the question whether it is possible to avoid either definitely referring to or definitely not referring to something, whether there is some intermediate state which is neither exactly that of referring or that of not referring. Since reference is not a gradable phenomenon, this is not a logically possible state. You either refer to something or you do not; there is no intermediate logical possibility. Many phenomena of ordinary language may be susceptible to treatment in terms of fuzzy logic's degrees of truth or falsity, but reference is not one of them. It is either simply true or simply false that you have referred to something. Thus there must be an exact point in a text where a reader shifts from extended metaphor to allegory.
Yet the same text has many readers, and for any one reader there may be many occasions of reading. Do all these readers always shift from extended metaphor to allegory -do they always start assigning referential interpretations to sourcerelated expressions -at exactly the same point in a text? Clearly, while there must be a precise point at which any particular reader on any particular occasion shifts from extended metaphor to allegory, there may be stretches of text containing different points at which such shifts can occur. Recognizing such stretches entails seeing language as subject to varying, or dynamic, semantic construal. Such a dynamic construal semantics does for the extended metaphor/allegory distinction what it does for lexical prototypes. What seem like the fuzzy effects of a single unchanging lexical prototype are, dynamic construal argues, in fact a function of different, but individually quite precise, construals of the same lexeme (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 92-104) . Dynamic construal reconciles the clear and distinct nature of at least many individually realized 'online' concepts with a general linguistic fuzziness. It can, similarly, recognize a qualitative, precise, distinction between extended metaphor and allegory, while recognizing the existence of intermediate stretches of text in which allegory emerges out of extended metaphor. Such stretches will involve a range of possible choices as to when exactly to shift from extended metaphor to allegory. Analysing such stretches of text requires first however that we consider the possible kinds of evidence for different possible construals of the same text.
Evidence
To switch from extended metaphor to allegory is to switch from blended space to possible situation. Considering the possible forms of evidence for such a switch thus involves considering the nature of the evidence for blending in general. Ray Gibbs, while expressing admiration for blending theory's conceptual fertility, argues that it has not so far proved falsifiable by the canons of scientific psychology (Gibbs, 2000 (Gibbs, , 2001 . He has also expressed quite recently his belief that this situation has not changed (personal face-to-face communication, 26 June 2008). He has in mind the absence of experimental evidence for blending in the first few hundred milliseconds of unconscious, linguistic processing. On the broadest construal of blending theory, however, one often assigned to it by blending theorists, it requires no such experimental evidence, being continually confirmed by everyday cognitive experience. On this broadest construal, blending is tantamount to the fact that we are continually bringing together, or blending, different concepts to form new ones. This is undoubtedly true but, unfortunately, its truth is that of a mere truism. What psychologist or philosopher, other than a behaviourist if any such still exist, doubts that we continually bring together existing concepts to create new ones? If blending theory amounts to no more than this, it does not amount to much. Yet analyses such as those of REGATTA or THE GRIM REAPER seem to amount to a great deal (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 63-5, 291-5) . When Gibbs says there is as yet no experimental evidence for blending, he must have a narrower construal of the theory in mind than that making it a mere truism. Such a narrower, rigorous construal is needed to do justice to both its insights and limitations.
A crucial issue here is the status of so-called simplex networks (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 120-2) . These are postulated to explain the semantics of such straightforward expressions as 'red pencil', 'Paul's daughter' or 'Sally's father'. The claim is that in each case two separate concepts, such as RED + PENCIL or FATHER & EGO + PAUL & SALLY, are fused in a blended space that provides the semantics for the expressions in question, a space directly modelling reality (see Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 121) . If things are as it models them -if for example there is a red pencil -you have truth. If they are not, you have falsity. Here we have nothing more than the fusion of two different concepts to form a new concept, that is, nothing more than the truistic version of blending theory. Crucially, all of the expressions here are, on any standard construal, literal. Instead of the conceptual indirection that defines figurative thought, the blended space here models reality directly and literally. When we turn to the expressions and networks associated with REGATTA or THE GRIM REAPER, however, things are very different. An expression like 'Death cut him down' is, on any standard construal, figurative. We cannot imagine death, an abstract entity, literally cutting anything down. This means that the blended space in which reaping concepts are fused with dying concepts cannot directly model reality. What is special about blending is not the fusion of concepts as such but rather the blended space's highly indirect relation to reality (Crisp, 2005a: 124-6 ). When there is no such conceptual indirection there is nothing worth calling blending. The only true blends are figurative blends.
We now have a narrower, constrained, version of blending. There is blending when, and only when, a conceptual integration network contains a mental space in which concepts are fused, or otherwise combined and/or related, and when this space as a result of this fusion cannot function directly as a reality space. Are such spaces psychologically real? Gibbs (2000) points out that there is as yet no evidence from experimental psychology. Are there any other possible sources of evidence? Flanagan (1997) argues that any theory of consciousness has to respond to three major sources of evidence: phenomenology, psychology/ cognitive science and neuropsychology. None should be ignored and convergence between all three should be sought. Thus, we seem to have memories of dreams. Unless we are logical positivists or Wittgensteinians, we believe we really do have dreams. This phenomenological evidence has now been reinforced by neuropsychological evidence: the 40-Hz range of neuronal oscillation associated with consciousness in general has been found to occur in the thalamo-cortical loop during REM sleep (Flanagan, 1997: 102-3) . (Psychology has found that people awoken from REM sleep have vivid 'memories' of dreams they believe they have just awoken from.) Neuropsychological and psychological evidence thus converge with the phenomenological evidence. Dreams really do happen. There is more to them than just what we say about them when awake, which is what the Wittgensteinian denies (Malcolm, 1968: 54-79) . Phenomenological evidence is a proper, though partial, source of evidence for psychological reality. Cognitive poetics should certainly be concerned with such evidence, for the most distinctive property of literature is surely a particular form of consciousness, namely, the heightened consciousness experienced by its readers.
The most important evidence for blending, I shall argue, is phenomenological. To support this argument I here provide an analysis of HD's 'Oread':
1 Whirl up, sea -2 Whirl your pointed pines 3 Splash your great pines 4 On our rocks, 5 Hurl your green over us, 6 Cover us with your pools of fir.
(HD, 1983: 55, emphasis added)
The apparent subject of this poem is the oread of the title, an ancient Greek mountain nymph. The primary literal referent is the sea with its waves.
(The previous sentence expresses a pragmatic judgement I unhesitatingly make; the reader must ask themselves if they agree.) The poem as a whole is an extended metaphor that mixes source-related and target-related language. Source-related, metaphorical, words are italicized and have been identified using the Pragglejaz Metaphorical Identification Procedure, or MIP (Pragglejaz Group, 2007) . Conceptually, at least two mental spaces are involved: the target space of the sea and the source space of the mountain nymph and her pine trees. In addition to the lexical units identified by the Pragglejazz procedure, the poem's sourcerelated language also involves an important grammatical element: five out of its six lines begin with imperative verbs whose semantics require the presence of an addressee. This addressee, necessarily a person, is specified in the first line/clause by the vocative sea, which the pragmatic maxim of relevance leads us to identify metaphorically with the oread of the title. The linguistic motivation, both lexical and grammatical, for postulating source and target spaces here is clear. But why in addition postulate a blended space?
The standard arguments for blending appeal to its effects on inference. In the case of 'Oread' it is hard to see what these are. A surgeon who is a butcher is incompetent or callously indifferent, depending on the pragmatic context (Brandt and Brandt, 2002) . But there is no obvious entailment following from the sea and its waves being a mountain nymph and her pine trees (Crisp, 1996: 86-7) . One might argue that the schematically triangular outline of a pine tree when fused with a wave leads to the entailment that waves approximate a triangular shape in cross-section. Yet concentrating on entailment here misses the point entirely. This poem produces the experience of waves and pine trees being in some strange impossible way fused together. It is as if, impossibly, the waves are pine trees. Certainly their shared schematic topology enables this seeming fusion, but what is at issue is our intense experience of it, not the grasping of the proposition that the waves have this topology. Although it is probably not logically impossible that a wave be a pine tree, it is still impossible in some very strong sense. To explain the sense of fusion we must postulate a blended space containing conceptual entities corresponding to both waves and pines. This space's simultaneous co-activation with the target and source spaces accounts for our experiencing the waves as pines in a single fused gestalt. Yet we know they are not, cannot be, pines. The blended space cannot directly model reality. It is the target space of sea and waves that does this. It is the phenomenological experience of the waves as pine trees that is accounted for by the blended space, which relates to reality only indirectly via its links to the target space. This kind of experience is surely a major part of what is evoked when metaphor is described as a form of 'seeing as'. Only blending, or something very like blending, can account for this experience.
'Oread' consists of an image, rather than a conceptual, metaphor. It might therefore be argued to be biased in favour of the argument that the major evidence for blending is phenomenological rather than inferential. In fact however it isolates something common to all new metaphors, to all metaphors that, rather than being automatized, are experienced consciously. Cruse, for example, regards a sense of fusion as an essential property of new metaphor, arguing that this justifies a blending account for all new metaphor (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 207-11) . For even when a new metaphor generates clear propositional entailments, it still creates a sense of fusion. Causley's extended metaphor of war as a casual mistress clearly generates the entailments WAR IS ATTRACTIVE and WAR IS FATAL. Beyond this however, just as 'Oread' makes us experience its waves as pine trees, Causley makes us experience war as a casual mistress (Causley, 1975: 14-15; Crisp, 2005a: 116-17, 124-6) . Although the generation of new entailments can often provide evidence for blending, it probably never necessitates a blending analysis.
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It is said for example that only such an analysis can explain why A SURGEON IS A BUTCHER entails THE SURGEON IS INCOMPETENT, since the concept of incompetence is not present in either the source or target spaces separately (Grady et al., 1999) . This is not so however. A direct source-to-target mapping of the typical hand movements of a butcher onto those of a surgeon will directly modify the conceptualization of the surgeon's hand movements in the target space, making them careless slashing movements. The inference that the surgeon is incompetent, or callous, will then arise directly in the target space without any need for a blended space. This does not mean that A SURGEON IS A BUTCHER cannot involve blending, but it does mean that a blending analysis of it is not necessary. The only evidence necessitating such an analysis is the conscious phenomenological experience of the fusing of source and target.
Between extended metaphor and allegory
The metaphorical target of Blake's 'A Poison Tree' is the emotion of anger. The poem's rejection of Christian 'love' as something whose denial of anger leads to destructive hate is too well known to need exposition. What is analysed here is its development from conventional to extended metaphor, and then on to full allegory: not rhyme with each other, however, since the rhyme scheme is AABB.) This positioning gives them prominence in terms of communicative dynamism (Quirk et al., 1985 (Quirk et al., : 1356 (MIP) claiming that a lexical unit is used metaphorically means no more and no less than that there is a linguistic basis, the contrast between the lexical unit's basic and contextual senses, for the analyst to construct a similarity based source/target correspondence (Pragglejaz, 2007: 1-4) . What actually goes on in readers' minds is another matter.
Blake's use of the word form grow evokes the conventional semantic value of the lexeme grow, including its conventional metaphoric value. What such automatized metaphorical language prompts in readers' minds is not clear. There is certainly no conscious fusion of source and target and so no clear evidence for blending. What goes on goes on unconsciously in the first few hundred milliseconds of linguistic processing and, as Gibbs (2000 Gibbs ( , 2001 , personal, face-to-face, communication, 26 June 2008) has pointed out, there is as yet no experimental evidence for blending here. This leaves two main possibilities: the unconscious activation of a conventionalized source to target correspondence or direct target access, so-called 'dead' metaphor. We have to consider the evidence for the 'online' processing of conventional metaphorical language. The accumulated evidence for the psychological reality of conventional metaphor is strong, the classic reference being Gibbs (1994) . Such evidence however by itself may support no more than the metaphoric structuring of the lexicon in long-term memory, without any actual 'online' activation (Gibbs, 1999) . In recent years, however, experimental evidence for the online activation of conventional expressions of the conceptual metaphor TIME IS SPACE has been provided by Boroditsky (2000 Boroditsky ( , 2001 Boroditsky and Ramscar, 2002) . TIME IS SPACE is a peculiarly important conceptual metaphor, occurring in all languages that have been studied, so we cannot assume from its online activation that all conventional metaphor is activated online. The supposition that much of it is, does, however, have to be taken seriously.
Blake's metrically and pragmatically prominent use of grow seems a good candidate for online metaphorical activation. Blending theorists would speak of the activation of an entrenched blend here but this, we have seen, goes well beyond the evidence. Since there is no conscious sense of fusion, no more than a simple source to target correspondence need be postulated. Given that the sense of fusion associated with new metaphor does require a blending analysis, evidence suggesting significant differences between the processing of new and conventional metaphors would in fact suggest that blending does not occur with conventional metaphor. Boroditsky (2000) shows in a series of priming experiments that, while the literal concept of SPACE primes for TIME IS SPACE metaphors, TIME IS SPACE metaphors do not prime for the literal concept of SPACE. This, she argues, means that the spatial concepts associated with TIME IS SPACE are highly partial and schematic rather than, as Lakoff and Johnson (1999) argue, the fully fleshed out concepts associated with our motor programs. While any new space-based metaphor has to begin by using such fully fleshed out spatial concepts, its conventionalization must gradually reduce these to a conceptual skeleton. Gentner's 'career of metaphor' hypothesis, which sees the shift from new to conventionalized metaphor as a shift from detailed analogical mapping to a general, highly schematic category, provides further experimental evidence for significant conceptual differences between new and conventional metaphor (Gentner and Wolff, 1997; Gentner and Bowdle, 2001 ). There is also important neuropsychological evidence supporting such a difference.
Work with both brain-damaged patients and functional MRI indicates that, while the interpretation of new metaphorical and figurative language is particularly associated with the right cerebral hemisphere, that of conventional metaphorical and figurative language is associated with the left hemisphere (Giora et al., 2000; Ahrens et al., 2007) . Coulson and Van Petten (2002) claim to have neuropsychological evidence for a lack of right/left hemisphere differentiation as well as on-line blending. The concept of blending they work with, however, seems to be of the truistic, almost vacuous kind, and the method of investigation they employ, that of event-related potentials, while marvellously accurate with regard to time, has little or no value in comparison with functional MRI for cerebral location (Banich, 1997: 74, 78, 81) , so their claims can be disregarded here. While it is thus plausible, although not certain, that Blake's use of grow will induce the online activation of a conventionalized, source-to-target correspondence in at least many readers' minds, it seems unlikely that any blend, entrenched or otherwise, will be involved.
The second verse of 'A Poison Tree' extends the conventional metaphor associated with grow. Its metaphorically used words are: water 'd, in, sunn'd and soft. EMOTIONS ARE PLANTS conventionally evokes a source in which plants grow by themselves. This source is thus conceptually extended here by the transitive verbs water'd and sunn'd. The speaker's anger becomes a 'cultivated' plant, one whose cultivator is the speaker/experiencer himself who, first as gardener and then as sun, fosters its growth with water and light. The expression of this conceptual extension of EMOTIONS ARE PLANTS is necessarily linguistically unconventional since the expression of any new concept requires new, or at least newly combined, language. Blake's development of extended metaphor here conforms strikingly to Lakoff and Turner's (1989) account of new poetic metaphor as essentially an extension of conventional metaphor. Lakoff and Turner's account emphasizes the continuity between new and conventional metaphor. 'A Poison Tree' shows that this account clearly contains a great deal of truth. Yet such continuity, we saw in the previous paragraph, is not the whole truth.
Language and Literature 2008 17(4) Lakoff and Turner (1989) antedates the creation of blending theory, of which Turner was a subsequent co-creator. Blending theory too generally emphasizes continuity between conventional and new metaphor, seeing blending as the basis of all forms of metaphor along with a huge amount of other things as well. In this article however, I follow Cruse in regarding it as probably characteristic of specifically new metaphor. (It is no part of the argument that blending is only associated with new 'metaphor': the same conscious sense of fusion can be found with new, non-metaphoric, figurative language, such as that expressing the REGATTA blend, and with physically acted out forms of play, ritual, sexual fantasy, drama and so on.) The conventional metaphor of the growth of anger in the first verse of 'A Poison Tree' 'comes alive' when it is extended in the second verse. The speaker's intensifying anger becomes, impossibly, a growing cultivated plant. It comes alive as a growing plant. This phenomenological sense of fusion is specific to new metaphor, whether it is completely new or new by virtue of extending a conventional metaphor. The especial value of extended metaphor in studying new metaphor is, precisely, that its relatively extended time of processing makes its conscious experience particularly explicit. This conscious experience is that of the blending of source and target, and it is what so strikingly differentiates the experience of extended metaphor in the second verse of 'A Poison Tree' from the purely conventional metaphor of its first verse.
In verse 2 of 'A Poison Tree' an extended metaphorical blend develops out of the purely conventional metaphor of verse 1. Similarly, in verse 3 an allegorical scene develops out of the blend of verse 2. In the marked up text of 'A Poison Tree' given previously, the shift from blend to allegorical scene is located immediately before the verb phrase bore an apple bright in l.10 of verse 2. Yet although, we have seen, there must on any single occasion of reading be a precise location for such a shift, this location is not fixed absolutely for all readings. The reader often has latitude as to where exactly to perform it. The crucial issue here, we have seen, is that of reference. We have to determine when, instead of a blend directly modifying the concept of a literal target referent, there is direct reference to fictional entities that only then function, collectively, as the allegorical source. The best way to study this referential shift in 'A Poison Tree' is by looking at the six tokens of the pronoun it in verses 2 and 3.
The two tokens of it in verse 2, ll.5 and 7, are unambiguously anaphoric with the noun phrase my wrath of l.4 in verse 1. Logically, there can be no question, in a verse with a large amount of explicitly target-related language, but that these tokens refer to the speaker's wrath. Yet more than just logic is involved. The speaker does refer, literally, to his wrath, but it is a wrath experienced as strangely, impossibly, fused with a growing, cultivated plant. The metaphorical blend, prompted by predicative rather than referential expressions, such as water'd and in, dramatically modifies the concept of that wrath, even as there can be no doubt that, as far as actual reference goes, the speaker is talking about that wrath. According to the way the poem is provisionally analyzed in the previous marked up version, this same combination of literal, logical reference with the Language and Literature 2008 17(4) phenomenological experience of blended fusion is found with the first two tokens of it in ll.9 and 10 in verse 3. This however is not the only possible interpretation of these pronouns.
The Pragglejaz MIP shows there to be both metaphorical and literal language in verse 2. In the previous marked up version however only one word in verse 3, grew, is identified as metaphorical. This word precedes the provisionally located shift from blend to fictional scene in l.10. For myself, the verb phrase in l.10 is so richly detailed that I have to project a concrete, fictional scene at this point. Not only is an apple specified, but our schematic knowledge of apples tells us we are dealing not with the generic plant of EMOTIONS ARE PLANTS but rather with a tree. The rest of verse 3 and all of verse 4 further elaborates this fictional scene, with the result that the two tokens of it in ll.11 and 12 have to be construed as referring directly, literally, to the apple produced by the schematically presupposed tree. This fictional apple tree corresponds allegorically to the speaker's wrath, which is no longer overtly referred to at all. Allegory has thus emerged out of an extended metaphorical blend. This is why none of the language in verse 3 after bore an apple is identified as metaphorical; it is taken to refer to and literally characterize a fictional, allegorical, scene. (Two words, stole and veil'd are identified as metaphorical in verse 4 but, since their targets are in the fictional situation, they are linguistic metaphors with no link to the underlying allegorical correspondence: these are the poem's instances of linguistic metaphor in allegory referred to in the first section of this article.) Grew in l.9 is however identified as metaphorical because, although it too relates to the domain of plants, being situated before the identified shift to allegory in l.10, it is seen as evoking a blend rather than characterizing a fictional situation. There is however no absolute reason to place the shift to allegory in l.10. It would be possible to interpret the two tokens of it in ll.9 and 10, or just the single token in l.10, as referring directly to a growing, fictional, plant that then corresponds allegorically to the speaker's wrath. In this case, all of the language in verse 3 would be literal. One could perhaps even interpret the tokens of it in ll.11 and 12 as referring directly to the speaker's wrath. For myself, it is the specificity of the verb phrase in l.10 that precipitates my projecting a concrete, fictional, situation. But other readers, and perhaps myself on some occasions, might shift from metaphorical blend to allegorical scene at an earlier or later point than this.
In 'A Poison Tree' a blend emerges out of conventional metaphor by means of metaphorical extension and then, by further extension and specification, an allegorical scene emerges out of the blend. This shift from blend to allegorical scene is not mechanical, for it could be made at a number of different points. One further point remains to be made briefly here. Blake has often been presented as a symbolic as opposed to allegoric artist, and some might question the propriety of describing any poem of his as even partially allegorical (Yeats, 1961a (Yeats, , 1961b . Such a view however is rooted in a false antithesis of allegory and symbol (Crisp, 2005b) . Blake himself never spoke of symbol but of vision and, although he used the term allegorical negatively often enough, he also, in a letter of 1803
Language and Literature 2008 17(4) to Thomas Butts, described his Prophetic Book Milton as a Sublime Allegory and asserted that 'Allegory address'd to the Intellectual powers…is…the Most Sublime Poetry' (Blake, 1966: 825) . The variations in Blake's use of the term allegory are related to, but not a mechanical function of, the question of whether he is talking about painting or poetry. There is unfortunately no space to go further into this here.
Consciousness, cognition and ontology
Although, as we have seen, the conscious experience of fusion provides the initial evidence for postulating a blend, this does not mean that the entire integration network associated with a blend is accessible to consciousness. It would for example be absurd to appeal to conscious experience to decide how many input spaces a given blend might have. Such a question, involving unconscious as well as conscious psychological reality, can at present only be dealt with by conceptual analysis and the construction of hypothetical models. Eventually the methods of experimental psychology and neuropsychology may supplement and reinforce those of phenomenology and conceptual analysis, but for now this is still a hope. One has to work with what is available.
A crucial issue with 'A Poison Tree' is what happens to the integration network in a reader's mind as they switch from extended metaphor to allegory, from conscious awareness of a blended space to conscious awareness of a fictional situation. It is implausible to suppose that the blended space simply ceases to exist. It has been highly activated in leading up to the emergence of the fictional situation and can be expected to continue to structure and inspire it, even if no longer as an immediate object of consciousness. In order to help model what may go on in the reader's mind at this point figures are needed. Figure 1 models what happens when reading l.4 of 'A Poison Tree', no more than a simple source to target correspondence being postulated for this wholly conventional metaphor. Figure 2 models what happens when ll.5-9 are read as extended metaphor. This straightforward blending analysis needs no especial comment, though it should be noted that, following Brandt and Brandt (2002) , it does not postulate a separate generic space. What is of particular interest is Figure 3 , which models the reading of ll.10-16 as allegory, particularly when it is compared with Figure 2 . Both figures are based on the same fundamental triangle of source, target and blended spaces. The source space of Figure 3 is more highly specified and developed than the source space of Figure 2 , but is still the same basic space. The same is true of the two target and blended spaces. The same fundamental integration network is present after, as before, the shift from extended metaphor to allegory. What changes, and it is a radical change, is its ontological interpretation.
In Figure co-activation of the blended space with the target, as well as source, space that accounts for the emotion of anger seeming impossibly to be a plant, even as the target space picks out that emotion as the sole real referent. The intense co-activation of the whole integration network creates a unified gestalt of source/target fusion even as it continues to precisely fulfil its differentiated logical functions. It is important to note that neither the source nor target spaces of Figure 2 are present to consciousness, being rather a part of unconscious cognition. (One must never confuse the target space, the means of reference, with the reality, whether actual or imagined, that it refers to.) The reader is conscious of what the poem takes as reality together with a blend that is fused with that reality in a single gestalt, while still being aware that that blend is not actually part of that reality. Cruse argues that the blending format throws no light on the phenomenological experience of 'seeing as' (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 209) . Yet in fact the simultaneous co-activation within an integration network of its different spaces and the correspondences between them seems precisely what is needed to account for the experience of 'seeing as'. It is this intense co-activation that creates the seeming fusion of source and target even as their different ontological statuses remain clear. Any mysteries that remain here are those involved with the relation between conscious experience and cognitive structures generally.
In Figure 3 , although we have essentially the same source, target and blended spaces as in Figure 2 , their ontological roles and consequent relations to consciousness are radically changed. The source space is no longer that of an extended, linguistic metaphor but of an allegory. It now, due to its incomparably more detailed and specified elaboration, models a fictional reality or situation and it is this that is the most immediate focus of the reader's conscious attention. That it does indeed model a fictional situation, rather than simply providing concepts to modify the target concept via fusion in the blended space, is shown by the fact that it is also, as Figure 3 shows, the target for the linguistic metaphors of ll.13-14. (These metaphors are fairly conventional, but in the context seem sufficiently re-vivified to justify postulating a blend rather than simply a sourceto-target correspondence.) This mental space models thus simultaneously what is both the allegorical source and also a linguistic target. Thus both the target and source spaces of the allegory function as situation models. The source space models a fictional situation in which the foe breaks into the garden, steals the poison apple and, by obvious inference, eats it and dies; the target space models the situation of reality as the poem takes it to be, a reality that the poem no longer refers to overtly at all. The situations these two spaces model are both present to the reader's consciousness, being linked metaphorically as source and target by the blended space and its input to them both. Although this space itself is no longer an immediate object of consciousness, we can, we have seen, reasonably assume its continued activation. We can thus, in response to the title of this article, say that though blending is not by itself enough, cannot by itself account for the phenomenon of allegory in particular or for metaphor in general, it is still to be seen as playing a crucial role in at least some metaphor, as well as in a number of significant non-metaphorical phenomena. Figure 3 
